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'Tis funny about th' constitution. It reads plain, but no wan
can undherstant it without an' interpreter.
-Mr. Dooley, On the Recall ofJudges
(Finley Peter Dunne) 1
Though it is regularly denied that . . . decisions [on issues of
constitutional law] are rooted only in the judges' moral predi-
lections, it is difficult to see what else can be involved once the
function of searching for the Framers' intent is abandoned.
-:Judge Robert H. Bork2
There are those who find legitimacy in fidelity to what they
call "the intention of the Framers." In its most doctrinaire in-



















* Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale University.
1. Fin!ey P. Dunne, Mr. Dooley, On the RetaU ofJudges, in MR. DooLEY ON 'l1iE CHOICE OF
LAw 168, 171 (Edward]. Bander ed., 1963).
2. Robert H. Bork, Judicial Review and Democracy, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 'l1iE AME1uCAN
CoNsmunON 1061, 1063 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1986).
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the Framers thought about the question under consideration
and simply follow that intention in resolving the case before
them. It is a view that feigns self-effacing deference to the spe-
cific judgments of those who forged our original social com-
pact. But in truth it is little more than arrogance cloaked as
humility.
-Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.8
I. ORIGINAUSM AND Brown v. Board ofEducation
A. Initial Hearing: Intent of the Framers Ignored
In Brown v. Board ofEducation,4 decided in 1954, the Supreme
Court held that public school segregation deprived black pupils
of "equal educational opportunities" in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."5 In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court
said nothing about whether the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment-the Congress that drafted the Amendment in
1866 and the States that ratified it in 1866-69-intended to outlaw
segregation in the public schools; instead, the Court treated their
intent as irrelevant, observing that "we cannot tum the clock
back" to the era of the Framers.6
Long before the Brown case reached the Supreme Court, the
courts had recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment, which
embodied the constitutional settlement of the Civil War (along
with the Thirteenth Amendment, forbidding slavery, and the Fif-
teenth, guaranteeing citizens the right to vote regardless of their
race, color, or previous condition of servitude), was intended to
give blacks the same rights as whites to enter into contracts, to
sue and be sued, and to testify in court.7 But in Plessy v. Ferguson,8
decided in 1896, the Supreme Court held that a Louisiana law
requiring railroads to provide "equal but separate" accommoda-
tions for blacks and whites was constitutional, even though the
Court acknowledged that "the object of the [Fourteenth Amend-
ment] was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the
3. William]. Brennan,Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contempurary Ratification.
27 S. TEX. L]. 433, 435 (1986). ' , ,
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
7. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
8. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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two races before the law."9 To justify this legal legerdemain, the
Court announced that the Fourteenth Amendment "could not
have been intended" to require racial "commingling," and that if
"the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority ... it is not by reason of anything
found in the [Louisiana law], but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it."10
Strictly speaking, Plessy v. Ferguson decided only that the Equal
Protection Clause permitted the States to require segregation in
public transportation. Predictably, however, the decision was
promptly, universally, and correctly understood to put the
Court's imprimatur on segregated schools, parks, theaters, res-
taurants, prisons, and other places where the races might "com-
mingle," whether by design or happenstance. Laws against black-
white marriages were upheld on the theory that the ban applied
impartially to both parties to the illicit intimacy,11 and some
States prohibited integrated graveyards,12 despite Andrew Mar-
vell's rueful comment that "none, I think, do there embrace.nIB
Kentucky made it a criminal offense for a private school to edu-
cate both white and black students even if the races were sepa-
rated, unless the classrooms were at least twenty-five miles
apart.14 Florida required school books used by blacks to be
stored separately lest they sully the hands (and the minds?) of
whites.15 (There is no record, however, of a ban on sharing sec-
ond-hand cigarette smoke.)
Although the "separate but equal" doctrine became the en-
trenched test of constitutionality for Jim Crow legislation, its
promise of "equality" was dead on arrival; black schools (which
by a bitter irony were often named after Abraham Lincoln, the
Great Emancipator) were notoriously below the white level in
measurable attributes like physical facilities, the training and ex-
perience of their teachers, staff salaries, and the range of courses
offered to their pupils, although in themselves these deficiencies
9. [d. at 544.
lb. [d. at 551.
. 11. See, e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
12. See CHARLES A. LoFGREN, THE PLESSY CAsE: A LEGAL-HIsrORICAL PERsPECTIVE 202
(1987).
13. Andrew Marvell, To His Coy Mistress 1.32 (1681), in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF
POETRY 337-38 (3d ed. 1983).
14. See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (rejecting Berea College's argu-
ment that a private school segregation statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. See LoFGREN, suJrra note 12, at 202.
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may have been less demeaning than their symbolic function as
badges of inferiority. The National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People won a few lawsuits in the 1930s and
1940s in a campaign to compel Jim Crow states to raise the sala-
ries ofblack teachers, but these victories were frustrated by delays
in compliance and by stratagems, such as salary scales geared to
discretionary judgments about the teacher's competence. More-
over, even the successful suits usually affected only a single
school district, leaving its neighbors free to do business as
usual.16
By 1950, however, the NAACP's lawyers decided to abandon
gradualism and attack the separate-but-equal formula head-on.
In Brown v. Board ofEducation-the generic label for five separate
school segregation cases that originated in Kansas, South Carer
lina, Virginia, Delaware, and the District ofColumbia-the plain-
tiffs renounced any claim that the black schools were inferior to
their white counterparts, hoping by this concession to prevent
the courts from evading the central issue by ordering palliatives
like higher salaries, improved playgrounds, or enlarged courses
of study. Thus, the NAACP staked everything on its allegation
that segregation in and of itself violated the Equal Protection
Clause by depriving black children of "equal educational
opportunities."17
Brown was argued before the Supreme Court three times: twice
on the merits; and a third time, after the Court held that state-
mandated segregation in public schools was unconstitutional, on
the remedy to be ordered. At the first argument, on December 9-
11, 1952, the Thurgood Marshall-led NAACP lawyers did not as-
sert that the Framers intended Equal Protection Clause to outlaw
school segregation. That claim would have been inconsistent
with the virtually universal racial separation that was practiced in
1868, in the North as well as the South, and even in the District
of Columbia, under the eyes of the very Congress that had
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment. Facing this troublesome
fact, the NAACP lawyers hoped to sidestep the "intent-of-the-
Framers" issue by avoiding an excursion into 19th Century his-
tory and focusing instead on the here and now-that is, the
16. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINsr SEGREGATED EDUCA-
TION, 1925-1950, at 82-104 (1987).
17. Id. at 136.
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meaning of "equal protection of the laws" in the second half of
the 20th Century.
This strategy was built on the Supreme Court's own rationale
in two 1950 cases in which the Court granted relief to black col-
lege students. One held that the University of Oklahoma could
not assign a student to a "Reserved for Colored" area of a class-
room or to a segregated desk in the library, because the isolation
would "impair and inhibit his ability to study [and] to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students."18 In the sec-
ond case, the Court ordered Texas to admit a black student to its
flagship law school at Austin because a newly-launched "separate
but [allegedly] equal" black law school lacked "those qualities
which are incapable of objective measurement but which make
for greatness in a law school."19 Furthermore, the Court asserted
that the separation would cordon the student off from "most of
the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with
whom [he] will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a mem-
ber of the Texas Bar.,,2o
Thus, the justices had flatly ruled that segregation denied
"equal protection of the laws" to black university students in
1950, whatever the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
might have believed or intended when it was drafted and ratified.
When the NAACP lawyers argued in Brown that the Court's 1950
insight should be extended to elementary and secondary schools,
they could point to findings by the trial judges in the Kansas and
Delaware cases that legally-enforced segregation was detrimental
to the educational development of the black children, even if the
schools were othenvise "equal."21
At the 1952 argument, this strategy of finessing the intent of
the Framers seemed to be successful. The NAACP lawyers were
not asked whether the Equal Protection Clause was intended to
outlaw school segregation, and attempts by the defense lawyers-
led by john W. Davis, a formidable and experienced appellate
lawyer, who had been the Democratic Party's candidate for Presi-
dent in 1924-to raise this issue were fruitless. Thus,justice Bur-
18. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
19. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
20. ld.
21. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JU5nCE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALl'lY 424, 428 (1975); ARGUMENT: THE
ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE TIiE SUPREME CoURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF To-
PEKA, 1952-1955, at 539-64 (Leon Friedman ed., 1983) [hereinafter ARGUMENT].
HeinOnline -- 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 14 1995-1996
14 Haruard Journal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 19
ton interrupted Davis in the middle ofa historical disquisition by
observing, "But the Constitution is a living document that must
be interpreted in relation to the facts of the time in which it is
interpreted."22 Of course, oral argument before the Supreme
Court is not a debate between the lawyers and the Justices (ex-
cept when imaginatively reenacted on TV), and inferences drawn
from judicial remarks often prove mistaken. Nonetheless,Justice
Burton's comment suggested that one of the Court's most con-
servative Justices believed in a "living" Constitution rather than
one with a meaning frozen in time by the intent of its Framers.
Nothing said by the other Justices suggested that they felt con-
strained by, or even were curious about, the intent of the Fram-
ers of the Equal Protection Clause.
B. Second Hearing: Intent of the Framers Resuscitated
But appearances turned out to be deceiving. OnJune 8, 1953,
about six months after the initial hearing, the Court set Brown
down for reargument, requesting counsel to discuss five ques-
tions, the first of which was:
What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted
and the State legislatures and conventions which ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not contem-
plate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish
segregation in public schools?23
This question, of course, revived the painful historical issue that
the NAACP lawyers hoped to dodge. The Court also asked
whether, assuming that the Fourteenth Amendment was not in-
tended to require the immediate abolition ofschool segregatio~,
its Framers nevertheless understood that the courts could abolish
it "in light of future considerations."24 An affirmative ans,ver
would imply that the Framers of the amendment bequeathed 'tis
, I
a "living" document, with a meaning that was expected to vary.~
the nation's values and circumstances change over time. Finally,
the Court asked the lawyers to propose an appropriate remedy,
"[a]ssuming that it is decided that segregation in public schools
violates the Fourteenth Amendment."25
22. KLUGER, supra note 21, at 573.
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The lawyers for the parties did not know what to make of the
Court's unusual request. One of the NAACP lawyers reduced his
earlier prediction of success from 75.,.25 to about 50-50, but
thought that the Court's reference to a "remedy" for segregation
showed that it was leaning in their direction.26 Assessing the case
from the defendants' side of the divide, however, John W. Davis
predicted that when the historical evidence was assembled, it
would bolster his earlier claim that "we've got it won, five-to-
four-or maybe six-to-three."27
The Supreme Court's questions about the intent of the Fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment were brief, but before re-
sponding, the lawyers had to search out and analyze thousands of
pages of old records, none of which were stored in an electronic
data base. The task was described by Richard Kluger in Simple
Justice, which analyzes the Brown case in microscopic but absorb-
ing detail:
The Fourteenth Amendment could not be examined in a
vacuum. It was the centerpiece in a decade of unprecedented
congressional ferment, and to understand the intentions of its
Framers, one had to comb through the spoken and written
words of hundreds of lawmakers. And since there were thirty-
seven states in existence at the time the amendment was rati-
fied, the understanding of legislators, governors, and other
public officials in every one of them would have to be ex-
amined as carefully as time and manpower allowed. It was a
job for scholars-constitutional experts, historians of the pe-
riod, authorities on the South and the Negro.28
For the NAACP lawyers, this scholarly job required what
Kluger calls a "six-month summer" of arduous research, which
began with a disappointment.29 They tried to recruit Henry
Steele Commager, the country's leading constitutional historian,
,for their research team, but he was out of the country. Worse
still, he wrote that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
~4id not, so far as we know, intend that it should be used to end
segregation in schools."30 Commager went on to urge "dropping
this~particularargument"31-a remark showing that despite his
26. See KLUGER, supra note 21, at 618-19.
27. Id. at 581.
28. Id. at 619.
29. Id. at 617.
30. Id. at 620.
31. KLUGER, supra note 21, at 620.
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academic laurels, he did not understand that a court's "request"
is not an invitation, but a command.
In the end, the NAACP lawyers managed to assemble a staff of
more than two-hundred historians and lawyers, including such
scholars as C. Vann Woodward,John Hope Franklin, and Horace
Mann Bond, to search through the archives for the data needed
to answer the Court's questions.32 For the defendants, John W.
Davis relied on a smaller (but no doubt better paid) team-half
a dozen summer trainees at his New York law firm, along with
some lawyers based in Richmond. Allied with Davis, the Attorney
General of Virginia was able to enlist the cooperation of his
counterparts in the thirty-six other States that had ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment in ransacking their local records.33 The
Department ofJustice assigned still another squad of lawyers to
the case, and their work produced a brief of 188 pages, but-
tressed by a historical appendix of 393 pages.34 In addition, even
before th~ Court propounded its questions to the litigants, Jus-
tice Frankfurter had instructed Alexander M. Bickel, his law clerk
and soon to become the brightest luminary of his generation of
constitutional scholars, to undertake a similar project.35
None of these assiduous excavations unearthed any pay dirt for
the plaintiffs. In fact, when the NAACP's scholars and lawyers as-
sembled at the end of the summer to evaluate their findings, a
dejected historian described the facts as "devastating."36 Of the
many legislators voting to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, a
few had expressed hopes that it would extirpate all racist legisla-
tion, but the lawyers could not make a silk purse of these bits and
pieces of history. To claim that the Framers as a whole intended
to create a color-blind America would have been inconsistent
with three undeniable facts. First, there was virtually no contem-
poraneous discussion of the impact of the Equal Protection
Clause on school segregation in the North, where it was a com-
mon practice. If the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in-
tended to force these northern States to abandon their familiar
ways, why was there not a wave of protest from legislative.die-
~ j ....
32. See id. at 621-24.
33. See id. at 636.
34. See id. at 651.
35. See id. at 653.






~ . . .
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hards against this federal intrusion into their "local" affairs?37
Second, both before and after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress itself maintained segregated schools in
the District of Columbia and it refused to prohibit school segre-
gation even when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875.38 Was it
plausible that Congress intended to abolish segregation by the
States when it maintained segregated schools in its own back
yard? Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment did not guarantee
blacks the right to vote; that was not assured until 1870, when the
Fifteenth Amendment was adopted to prohibit the denial of suf-
frage "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude."39 How could the Equal Protection Clause have been
intended to abolish school segregation if it did not even give
blacks the right to vote?
Hoping to escape from the dismal historical record, the
NAACP lawyers eschewed a detailed analysis of the intent of the
Framers in favor of a more abstract level ofanalysis. They argued
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were animated
by an overarching intent to outlaw racial discrimination, and that
the Equal Protection Clause should be interpreted to eliminate
all badges of servitude, whether they engaged the conscious at-
tention of the Framers or not:
The evidence makes clear that it was the intent of the pro-
ponents of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the substantial
understanding of its opponents, that 'it would, of its own force,
prohibit all state action predicated upon race or color. The
intention of the Framers with respect to any specific example
of caste state action-in the instant cases, segregated educa-
tion-cannot be determined solely on the basis ofa tabulation
of contemporaneous statements mentioning the specific prac-
tice. The Framers .... could not list all the specific categories
of existing and prospective state activity which were to come
within the constitutional prohibitions. The broad general pur-
pose of the Amendment-obliteration of race and color dis-
tinctions-is clearly established by the evidence.40
.This generous interpretation of the intent of the Framers is be-
lied by their ambivalence about giving blacks a federally-guaran-
_ 37. Eor one such protest, directed against legislation rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment itself, see ARGUMENr, supra note 21, at 186.
38. See KLUGER, supra note 21, at 635.
39. U.S. CoN5r. amend. XV, § 1.
40. Brief for Appellants on Reargument at 18, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), in 49 1..ANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENrS OF THE SUPREME CoURT OF mE UNITED
STATES: CoNS'I1TUTIONAL LAw 531 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1975).
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teed right to vote, a refonn that had to wait until Ulysses S. Grant
captured the presidency and the Republican Party managed to
force through the Fifteenth Amendment Moreover, if the Fram-
ers intended to "prohibit all state action predicated upon race or
color," their draft of the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily sub-
sumed a constitutional right to interracial marriage-an idea so
shocking in 1868 that by itself it might have sufficed to block
ratification of the nascent amendment. Indeed, if the Fourteenth
Amendment was the noble charter of equality portrayed by the
NAACP brief, much of American racial history during the next
century would be inexplicable.
Reminiscing about this attempt by the NAACP's lawyers to put
a good face on the historical record, one of its consulting schol-
ars said "I am very much afraid that ... I ceased to function as an
historian and instead took up the practice of law without a li-
cense. . . . It is not that we were engaged in fonnulating lies;
there was nothing as crude and naive as that But we were using
facts, emphasizing facts, bearing down on facts, sliding off facts
in a way to do what [Thurgood] Marshall said we had to do-'get
by those boys down there.' "41
The implication that the NAACP brief played fast and loose
with the facts of history was revived by the SenateJudiciary Com-
mittee in 1962, when the Committee held hearings on Marshall's
nomination to the United States Court ofAppeals for the Second
Circuit42 The charge surfaced again in 1967, when Marshall was
nominated by President Johnson to the Supreme Court43 The
allegation, however, was a red herring; lawyers are assiduous and
adroit window-dressers, and their briefs routinely make use of
"law office history" or, to use a more contemporary label, "advo-
cacy scholarship."44 This does not mislead the judges; as practi-
tioners of the same art, they know it when they see it In actuality,
there was another explanation, more benign and perhaps more
accurate, for Thurgood Marshall's assertion that the Fourteenth
41. KLUGER. supra note 21, at 640.
42. See Hearings Before a Subcomm. ofthe Senate Comm. on theJudiciary on the Nomination of
Thurgood Marshall, ofNew York, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, 8'lth
Cong., 2d Sess. 181-89 (1962) (testimony ofAlfred H. Kelly, Professor of History, Wayne
State Univ.).
43. See Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary on the Nomination ofThurgood Mar-
shal!, ofNew York, to be an AssociateJustia ofthe Supreme Court ofthe United States, 90th Cong••
1st Sess. 182 (1967) (statement of Michael D. Jaffe, General Counsel, Liberty Lobby)•.
44. See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Contraversy: The Essential Contradictions ofNor-
mative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1063, 1109 (1981).
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Amendment was intended to "prohibit all state action predicated
upon race or color"-that Thurgood Marshall, like Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., had a dream that "this nation will rise up and live
out the true meaning of its creed . . . that all men are created
equal."45
C. The Outcome: Intent of the Framers Reburied
On September 8, 1953-three months before the Brown case
was to be reargued-ChiefJustice Vinson died. He evidently had
been too conflicted about the case to exercise a leadership role
in the Court's preliminary discussions. Justice Frankfurter, who
was strenuously trying to achieve a unanimous decision for the
plaintiffs, was reported to say that Vinson's death "is the first
solid piece of evidence I've ever had that there really is a God."46
To succeed Vinson as ChiefJustice, President Eisenhower nomi-
nated Earl Warren, who took his seat on the Court in time to
hear the 1953 argument.47
The NAACP lawyers naturally expected the reargument to fo-
cus on the questions posed by the Court after the initial argu-
ment, and especially on whether Congress and the state
legislatures contemplated or understood in 1866-69 that the
Fourteenth Amendment would abolish segregation in the na-
tion's public schools. But when they argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to "deprive the states of all power to
make or impose racial distinctions or classifications," their claim
seemed to arouse no interest. Indeed, only Justice Frankfurter
reacted to the NAACP's evidence of the Framers' intent, and he
intelVened primarily to brush aside as irrelevant "individual ut-
terances of this, that or [the] other Congressmen or Senators."48
Judging from the questions put to the lawyers during the reargu-
ment, the Justices no longer were troubled-if, in actuality, they
eyer had been-by the specter that had haunted the NAACP.
, According to a careful analyst of the Court's deliberations,
when the Justices met three days later to discuss the Brown case,
, ~. Martin Luther King,Jr., I Have a Dream (March on Washington, Aug. 28, 1963), in
k TESTAMENT OF HOPE 217, 219 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986).
46. Philip Elman & Nonnan Silber, The Solicitor General's Office, ]ustiu Frankfurter, and
CiVil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARv. L. REv. 817, 840 (1987) •
.47. Warren heard the 1953 argument as a recess appointee; he was not confinned until
March'of 1954. See Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What &aUy Happened in Brown v. Board
of Education, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1867, 1869 n.9 (1991).
48. ARGUMENT, supra note 21, at 187-88.
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the conference was "striking for what was not discussed;" the issue
of the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment "ap-
peared to be dead."49 There already was a growing consensus in
favor of outlawing segregation, which soon ripened into unanim-
ity. When the Court issued its opinion on May 17, 1954, it an-
nounced that the evidence of the Framers' intent was "at best ...
inconclusive," explaining that when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified, little attention was given to its effect on public edu-
cation because free schools were rare in the South, and the
school year in the North often was only three months long and
compulsory attendance was virtually unknown.so The Court went
on to say that "we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
[Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted," but must instead "con-
sider public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the Nation."s1 (If the
NAACP historians were pained when the Court so bluntly con-
signed the fruits of their research to the dustbin of history, they
did not mourn in public.)
Mer denying that the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Framers had any bearing on the constitutional issue before it, the
Court needed-or at least, took-only two paragraphs to explain
why school segregation deprives black children of "equal educa-
tional opportunities" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court first referred to its 1950 cases ruling that Texas could
not shunt black students off to a segregated law school that
lacked "those qualities which are incapable of objective measure-
ment but which make for greatness in a law school,,,s2 and that
Oklahoma could not subject a black graduate student to condi-
tions impairing his ability to exchange views with ..other stu-
dents.53 Next, the Court held:
Such considerations apply with added force to children in
grade and high schools. To separate them from others ofsimi-
lar age and qualifications solely because of their race gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone.... We conclude that in the field of public educa-
49. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme
Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. LJ. I, 40 (1979).
50. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
51. Id. at 492-93.
52. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
53. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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tion the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no flace. Sepa-
rate educational facilities are inherenJiy unequal.
These brief and simple sentences-the crux of the opinion-
were almost an anticlimax to the agonized arguments that had
engulfed the NAACP's leaders and lawyers when they debated
whether it was too risky to abandon gradualism in favor of a fron-
tal attack on the separate-but-equal formula.
A year after ruling that school segregation was unconstitu-
tional, the Court addressed what it called "the complexities· aris-
ing from the transition to a system of public education freed of
racial discrimination."55 Blowing hot and cold, the Court ac-
knowledged that the plaintiffs had a "personal interest . . . in
admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondis-
criminatory basis," but it sent the cases back to the lower courts,
authorizing them to "take into account the public interest in the
elimination of [administrative] obstacles in a systematic and ef-
fective manner" and to "enter such orders and decrees consistent
with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit [the
pupils in the cases before it] to public schools on a racially non-
discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed."56 The age of de-
segregation was about to begin. Thirty-eight years later, we know
that its end is not yet in sight; in fact, Brown v. Board ofEducation
itself is still before the courts, which have not yet decided
whether the Topeka school system has eliminated all vestiges of
its pre-1954 segregation.57
II. A CRITIQUE OF ORIGINALISM
IT legal doctrines could die, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Brown would have qualified as a death certificate for "original-
ism"-the theory that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed
irrevocably by the intent of its Framers. But legal theories, no
matter how debilitated, linger on in the law libraries, ready to be
returned to duty by a new generation of lawyers, judges, and
legal scholars. So with originalism; it was not merely resuscitated;
within a quarter of a century after Brown, it became the causus
beUi in a struggle about constitutional interpretation that has en-
54. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
55. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
56. Id. at 300-01.
57. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2994 (1993).
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gaged the nation's preeminent legal theorists. The initial battle
field was the scholarly press, but the controversy spilled over into
the public arena in 1987, whenJudge Robert H. Bork, President
Reagan's nominee to succeed Justice Lewis Powell on the
Supreme Court, was quizzed by the Senate Judiciary Committee
about his originalist convictions.58 This Kulturkampfover what At-
torney General Meese called the 'Jurisprudence of Original In-
tent"59 has produced numerous books with such titles as
Interpreting the Constitution,60 On What the Constitution Means,61 and
Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution62 to rival in volume the
recent tidal wave of published seU:improvement manuals. Of the
legal tracts, only one-Bork's Tempting ofAmerica,63 written after
the Senate refused to confirm him-managed to get on the New
Yom Times's best-seller list; but perhaps that only was because
readers believe that their psyches need more attention than the
Constitution.
A. Historical Background
Disagreement about the proper way to interpret the Constitu-
tion began soon after its ratification in 1789. As early as 1833,
JusticeJoseph Story, serving simultaneously as Dane Professor of
Law at the Harvard Law School, complained in his influential
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States that "the rules
of interpretation have often been shifted to suit the emergency;
and the passions and prejudices of the day . . . have not unfre-
quently furnished a mode of argument which would, on the one
hand, leave the Constitution crippled and inanimate, or, on the
other hand, give it an extent and elasticity subversive of all ra-
tional boundaries."64Justice Story went on to prescribe a series of
interpretative principles that would, in his view, avoid both Scylla
and Charybdis; but he first announced, "Where [the Constitu':
tion's] words are plain, clear, and determinate, they require no ~
58. See Hearings on the Ncmzination ofRobert H. Bark to be AssociateJustice of the Supreme
Court ofthe United States Before the Senate Committee on theJudiciary, 100th Cong., 1st SeS.!l. l~g
(1987). '
59. See Edwin Meese m, Toward aJurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARv. J.L. & Pun.
POL'y 5 (1988). '
60. IfARRy H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CoNsrrrunON (1990).
61. SoTJRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CoNSTITlTJ'ION MEANs (1984).
62. LEONARD W. LEvY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CoNSTITlTJ'ION (1988). , ,
63. RoBERT H. BoRK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POUTICAL SEDUCTION OF WE LAW
(1990). ,
64. 1JOSEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 398
(Thomas Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873). , C ••
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interpretation; and it should, therefore, be admitted, if at all,
with great caution, and only from necessity, either to escape
some absurd consequence, or to guard against some fatal evil."65
Above all, Story declared:
Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical sub-
tleties, for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for
elaborate shades ofmeaning. or for the exercise ofphilosophi-
cal acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a
practical nature, founded on the common business of human
life, adapted to common wants, designed for common use,
and fitted for common understandings. The people make
them, the people adopt them, the people must be supposed to
read them, with the help of common-sense, and cannot be
presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning or any ex-
traordinary gloss.66
Justice Story's threshold assertion that there is no need for "in-
terpretation" if the constitutional words "are plain, clear, and de-
terminate"-the "plain-meaning rule" or pejoratively,
"textualism"-often is dismissed as simplistic, fatuous, or disin-
genuous and it can lead to ridiculous results.67 For example,
even the dullest law teacher can drum up student merriment
with Olmstead v. United States,68 a 1928 opinion by ChiefJustice
Taft holding that federal officials who wiretapped the telephone
conversations of a gang of bootleggers did not violate the Fourth
Amendment (guaranteeing "[t]he right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures")69 because the eavesdroppers did
not "search" or "seize" any "persons, houses, papers and effects,"
but merely listened.70
65. 1 id. § 405. The same point had been announced with even greater majesty a few
years earlier by ChiefJustice Marshall, who said that if the "plain meaning" of a Constitu-
tional provision is to be disregarded "because we believe the framers of that instrument
could not intend what they said, [the case] must be one in which the absurdity and injus-
tice ofapplying the provision to the case would be so monstrous that alI mankind would,
without hesitation, unite in rejecting the applicant." Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S.
(4 'Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819). But see the less superheated standard enunciated by McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819) ("It is essential to just construction,
that many words which import something excessive, should be understood in a more
mitigated sense-in that sense which common usage justifies.").
66. 1 STORY, supra note 64, § 451.
67. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-41 (Harv. Univ. Press 1980);
MARK TUSHNET, RED WHITE, AND BLUE 60-69 (Harv. Univ. Press 1980).
68. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
69. U.S. CaNST. amend. IV.
70. Olmstead, 227 U.S. at 464. The Supreme Court later overruled the case sub silentio in
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applied to
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Critics of the plain meaning principle sometimes concede, al-
beit grudgingly, that a few constitutional provisions have a clear
meaning-for example, the requirement that a person be thirty-
five years old to qualify to be President.71 But even this provision
has its ambiguities, although so far they have arisen only in class-
room exercises. For instance, the bare language-"No person ex-
cept a natural born Citizen ... shall be eligible to the Office of
President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who
shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States"72-does not
tell us whether the thirty-five year period is to commence on the
day of birth, at the candidate's conception (as in Chinese impe-
rial astrology), or (as in some cultures) on the first day of the
calendar year of birth; whether the candidate must be thirty-five
years old on Election Day, on the day of the Electoral College's
report to Congress, or upon taking the oath of office; whether
"natural born" includes conception by in vitro fertilization, deliv-
ery by Caesarian section, or birth on foreign soil to American
parents; or whether time spent abroad as a member of our
armed forces, as an American ambassador, or as a Rhodes
scholar can be credited against the fourteen-year residence
requirement.
Even if these ambiguities are dismissed as fanciful and the
"core" of the Presidential constitutional requirements-thirty-
five years of age, fourteen years of residence-is conceded to be
"plain, clear, and determinate,,73 for practical purposes, constitu-
tional litigation almost always requires the courts to interpret
provisions that are fogged in ambiguity. For example, the courts
must interpret the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process
Clause,74 and more specialized phrases like the "rights ... re-
the surreptitious use of an electronic listening device, even though the only "thing" that
was "seized" was a conversation).
71. For a rigorous originalist, however, even the plainest and clearest language must,
give way if it is inconsistent with the intent of the framers. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, .The
Founders' VUfW-According toJefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1033, 1062 (quoting HattOn'$'
statement that in interpreting and Act of the British Parliament, "a provable intention
would override the words"); see also C. HArrON, A TREATISE CoNCERNING STATUTES Q~
Acrs OF PARLIAMENT AND THE ExposmON THEREOF 14-15 (London 1677) (arguing that
whenever there is a departure from the plain language to the intent, the intent must 1:le
well proved).
72. U.S. CoN5r. art. I, § 1, d. 5. '7'
73. 1 STORY, supra note 64, § 405. ' I • . •
74. U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("No person shall .•• be deprived of life, liberty, or propertY.
without due process oflaw"). ' .• t ,
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tained by the people,"75 "no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"76 "the free-
dom of speech,"77 "cruel and unusual punis~ents,"7? and "a
speedy and public trial."79
Although Justice Joseph Story's default rules for interpreting
text that is not "plain, clear, and determinate" do not defer ex-
plicitly to the intent of the Framers, Justice Story observed that
"much . . . may be gathered from ... contemporary interpreta-
tion,"so a catch-all that could include statements by the Framers
manifesting their intent. ButJustice Story warned that "contem-
porary interpretation must be resorted to with much qualifica-
tion and reserve" because, among other reasons, "[n]othing but
the text [of the Constitution] was adopted by the people."Sl Even
so, the Supreme Court often invoked the intention of the Fram-
ers in deciding constitutional disputes during the 19th Century,
but usually only as a makeweight or buttress to a conclusion rest-
ing on an independent foundation.s2 Moreover, the Framers' in-
tent ordinarily was not gathered from the ratification debates or
other "extrinsic" sources-the raw materials that today's original-
ists search through, in the manner exemplified by the NAACP
lawyers in responding to the Supreme Court's questions in Brown
v. Board ofEducation-but by inference from the constitutional
language as adopted (in legal parlance, from within the "four
corners" of the document).83 Thus, by applying common sense
to the constitutional provision forbidding federal officials to ac-
cept "any present, Emolument, Office or Title ... from any King,
, 75. U.S. CoN5r. amend. X.
76. U.S. CoN5r. amend. I.
.. 77. U.S. CoN5r. amend. I.
78. U.S. CoN5r. amend. vm.
79. U.S. CoN5r. amend. VI.
80. 1 id. § 390.
• '81. 1 id.
82. In the first such instance, Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 173 (1796), thejus-
tices alluded to what the Framers "intended," "contemplated," and "meditated," but de-
scribed at greater length their own views about the requirements ofjustice and equality.
justice Paterson even used an extract from Adam Smith's Wealth ofNations as the clincher
to his concurrence. Id. at 180-81 (Paterson,j., concurring); if.joseph Tussman &jacobus
tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341, 344-53 (1949) (arguing
that; in' assessing the reasonableness of any legislative classification, one should examine
tht: 'purpose of the law in question).
83. See H. jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 885, 915. See generally Hans W. Baade, 'Original Intent' in Historical Perspective: Some
Critical Glosses, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1001 (1991); Berger, supra note 71; H. jefferson Powell,
The Modem Misunderstanding ofOriginal Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1513 (1987) (reviewing
RAOUL BERGER, THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987»; LEvY, supra note 62.
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Prince, or foreign State,"84 a court could conclude that the Fram-
ers "intended" to prevent corrupt or secret bargains with a for-
eign power, even if they neither debated the issue nor left any
other clues to their objectives.85
For a century and a half, originalism consisted of little more
than sporadic appeals by individual Justices to the intent of the
Framers; not until the second half of this century was it con-
verted into an article of faith, preached by a stern band of schol-
arly missionaries. Their trailblazer was Professor William W.
Crosskey of the University of Chicago, who undertook to dispel
the "sophistries" of the "living-document" school of constitu-
tional interpretation86 and to unveil nothing less than "the his-
toric and intended meaning"87 of the Constitution in a two-
volume work entitled Politics and the Constitution in the History oj
the United States, published in 1953 and augmented by a posthu-
mously published third volume. Combining prodigious erudition
and revolutionary conclusions, Crosskey's book either illumi-
nated or obfuscated-the reviewers were irretrievably split-al-
most everything under the constitutional sun, especially the
meaning of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, empowering
Congress "to regulate Commerce ... among the several States."88
As traditionally construed when Crosskey began his research, in-
terstate commerce meant the exchange of goods across state
lines; it did not include manufacturing, mining, agriculture, or
other productive activities, even if the goods were destined for
markets in other States. This constricted view of the Commerce
Clause-epitomized as "Commerce succeeds to manufacture,
and is not a part ofit"89-became a major constitutional obstacle
to the early New Deal economic reforms. The view appeared to
prevent Congress from regulating factory workers' hours and
wages, requiring collective bargaining, or fixing agribusiness pro-
duction quotas. • .
84. u.s. CoNSI". art. I, § 9, d. 8.
85. In fact, the provision was evidently inspired by an "accident" (as it was described in
the debates ofthe Philadelphia Convention) in which Benjamin Franklin, while seIVing as
ambassador to France, accepted a snuff box with a miniature portrait of Louis XVI. See 3
MAx FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 327 (1911). ' ,
86. 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CoNSTI11JTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED S1'Arts
1172 (1953). .
87. 1 ill. at vii. • J, . .
88. U.S. CoNSI". art I, § 8, d. 3.
89. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895). " ., ,
HeinOnline -- 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 27 1995-1996
No.1] Interpreting the Constitution 27
To establish that this perceived barrier to federal regulation of
the national economy was a constitutional red herring, Crosskey
ransacked a daunting array of old dictionaries, treatises,)egal de-
cisions, political pamphlets, and newspapers to compile what he
called "a specialized dictionary of the eighteenth-eentury word-
usages, and political and legal ideas, which are needed for a true
understanding of the Constitution."90 Armed with this glossary,
Crosskey announced that the wording of the Commerce Clause
was broad enough to include not only trade that crossed state
boundaries, but also "the gainful activities of [the] nation, as a
whole,"91 so that Congress was authorized to regulate factories
and farms, even if their products were sold only to local
consumers.
Had Crosskey's expansive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause been accepted by the Supreme Court in President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt's first term, it would have been manna from
heaven for the lawyers of the early New Deal; but by 1953, when
his treatise was published, its conclusion was of interest only to
antiquarians. It had become irrelevant because, completing a
process that began even before Crosskey commenced his re-
search, the Supreme Court had demolished the legal wall be-
t'\veen "local" manufacturing and "interstate" trade by ruling that
Congress's power to regulate commerce included the power to
regulate economic activities that "affect" interstate com-
merce92-a test that, the Court later held, was satisfied by even
such minuscule enterprises as raising crops on a family farm for
home consumption.93 .
. Because ofhis obsessive quest for the 18th Century meaning of
the words used by the Constitution's authors, Crosskey's original-
ism was diluted with textualism. He was soon overshadowed by a
purist, however, for whom the intent of the Framers was para-
mount no matter what words they chose to use: Raoul Berger.94
90. 1 CROSSKEV, supra note 86, at 5.
. ~n. 1 id. at 89.
9~, See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Daily, 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).
,93. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
94. A self-described "fiddler turned lawyer," Berger abandoned his post as a orchestral
.violinist for a conventional career in law, and then became a free lance scholar, working
In'Harvard's law library without the benefits or distractions of a tenure track. appoint-
ment. Still active in his nineties, Berger has been called "the dean of scholars of the
American Constitution" by Professor Philip B. Kurland, Distinguished SeIVice University
Professor at the University of Chicago. As a leading candidate for the post himself, Kur-
land may not have the right to transfer his claim to a rival; but his opinion, suitably dis-
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Less than two decades after Crosskey's work faded from popular
attention, Berger focused on the issue of original intent in his
book Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems.95 This book under-
took to refute "bald assertions proceeding from assumptions that
are at war with the intention of the Framers" and to rescue their
"grand design" from obscurity.96 Berger followed up this entry
into the originalist arena with an ambitious series ofother disqui-
sitions on the death penalty, executive privilege, federalism, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and other disputed constitutional is-
sues, proclaiming that the courts had violated the intent of the
Framers in each of these areas. Almost alone among constitu-
tional historians, Berger somehow contrives to fit every fragment
of history into a flawless mosaic; there are never any holes, any
superfluous pieces, or any room for argument. Moreover,
although he is more prolific than the entire faculty of many law
schools, Berger evidently never has investigated a controversial
decision without reaching the conclusion that it flouts the intent
of the Framers. This is strange; one might have thought that even
a Supreme Court that cannot shoot straight would score an occa-
sional bull's-eye by a lucky ricochet.
Judge Robert H. Bork, whose constitutional theories first came
to public attention when President Reagan nominated him to fill
the Supreme Court vacancy created by Justice Lewis F. Powell's
resignation in 1987, also is a tireless advocate of originalism;
though his mitieris to hurl thunderbolts rather than to assemble
meticulously patterned mosaics. In The Tempting ojAmerica, a spir-
ited work written after the Senate refused to confirm his nomina-
tion, Bork fulminates against "today's constitutional cognoscenti,
who would have judges remake the historic Constitution from
such materials as natural law, conventional morality, prophetic
vision, the understanding of an ideal democracy, or what have
·yoU."97 This "heresy," as Bork terms it, is propagated by "left-wing
activists," who fear a revival of "the orthodoxy of original under-
standing" because they want to use the Constitution as a weapon
counted for modesty, must be taken seriously. See Philip B. Kurland, Foreword to RAOUL
BERGER, SELECI"ED WRITINGS ON THE CONsrmmON (1987).
95. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CoNsrmmONAL PROBLEMS (1973).
96. [d. at 5. Written "for scholars andjurists," Berger's treatise was republished a year
later in paperback because his views on impeachment had "suddenly ceased to be merely
ofantiquarian interest"-thanks largely to the inadvertent cooperation ofRichard Nixon
and the Watergate scandal. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CoNsrmmONAL
PROBLEMS xi (paperback ed. 1974).
97. BoRK, supra note 63, at 6.
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in a class struggle over social and political values.98 For Bork, the
clash over his nomination was "simply one battle in this long-run-
ning war for control of our legal culture;"99 his opponents had to
"defeat a nominee who had for long expressed in writing the phi-
losophy of original understanding and had tried to show the lack
of any constitutional foundation for some of the liberal culture's
most important victories."loo
In Bork's interpretive philosophy, the intent of the Framers is
not merely a clue to the meaning of the Constitution to be
weighed along with other sources of enlightenment. Instead,
Bork makes the arresting preemptive claim that originalism is in-
herent in the very idea of a constitution, which would become a
will-o'-the-wisp if interpreted more loosely. In espousing "the rule
that judges must stick to the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion's words," Judge Bork goes so far as to assert that if this prin-
ciple had been unknown to the Framers themselves, we would
have to invent it, because "[n]o other method of constitutional
adjudication can confine courts to a defined sphere of authority
and thus prevent them from assuming powers whose exercise al-
ters, perhaps radically, the design of the American Republic."101
If this portentous warning is valid, a "living constitution"-one
with a meaning that changes over time-is, at best an oxymoron;
at worst, a fraud.
In contending that the only legitimate way to interpret the
Constitution is to search out and follow the intent of the Fram-
ers, Bork and his fellow originalists make much of a so-called
counter-m~oritarian difficulty-the idea that when the Supreme
Court rules that a federal or state law is unconstitutional, it neces-
sarily rejects a decision made by the people's elected representa-
tives. Such action by the Court, we are admonished, is anomalous
in a democratic society because the Justices are not elected and
they hold office for life. This is why Professor Alexander M.
Bickel, who had been Justice Frankfurter's law clerk when the
Brown case was before the Court, asserted in an eloquent and
probing book entitled The Least Dangerous Branch that "judicial
review is a deviant institution in the American democracy."102
But Bickel never advocated the abandonment ofjudicial review
98. Id. at 7-8.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Id. at 154-55.
102. A1.ExANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (2d ed. 1986).
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in order to bring our institutions into hannony with democratic
theory. He was an accommodationist, not a rebel, and after
catching the reader's attention with his "deviant institution" la-
bel, he acknowledged that we live in a hybrid democracy of
which judicial review is a component part, not a deplorable lapse
from an imagined Platonic ideal.lOS Indeed, Bickel himself could
rhapsodize about the benefit of having federal judges as guardi-
ans of our constitutional rights and liberties:
[C]ourts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of
principle that legislatures and executives do not possess.
Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the
insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the
ends of government.... Their insulation and the marvelous
mystery of time give courts the capacity to appeal to men's
better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have
been forgotten in the moment's hue and cry.104
B. Problems in Ascertaining Original Intent
Accepting arguendo, however, the originalist assertion that ad-
herence to the intent of the Framers will shield us againstjudicial
tyranny by diminishing the opportunities for interpretive discre-
tion, how do we ascertain what the Constitution's Framers-all
long dead-intended? Originalists assure us that we need not
rummage through colonial attics for unpublished diaries or en-
gage in posthumous psychoanalysis, because what counts is the
public record, not the Framers' private ruminations. So far, so
good. But on reflection, one finds that "so far" is not very far,
This is because most of the documents from which originalists
reconstruct the Framers' intent, although useful today, were not
known to the ratifiers and hence might just as well have been
secret diaries.
At the summit of the canon of originalist sources is the official
journal of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which draft~d
the Constitution to replace the rickety Articles of Confederation
of 1781. But James Madison, the "Father of the Constitutioil~"
maintained that the Philadelphia proceedings "can have no au-
thoritative character," because the document emanating from its
f ( •
103. In contrast to Bork's magisterial pronouncement on the essentiality of original
intent, Bickel argued that it is relevant, but that complete observance threatens dIsaster
for a written Constitution. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding llnd the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REv. I, 3 (1955).
104. BICKEL, supra note 102, at 25-26. , .'.
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fifty-five delegates "was nothing more than the draft of a plan,
nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed
into it by the voice of the people, speaking through [the state]
Conventions"105 that ratified the Constitution in 1788-89. In
short, the Philadelphia delegates offered a proposal to a political
community that its preamble called "We the People;"106 it was
the 1,750 members of the state conventions (or possibly, as some
argue, the people who elected these delegates) who created the
Constitution, and who, therefore, were its true "framers" or
"founders."107
By its actions, the Philadelphia Convention confirmed
Madison's view that it was a body of theorists and scriveners, not
a nation-builder. To insulate themselves from public pressure,
the delegates met under a rule of secrecy (a practice deplored by
Jefferson as "abominable") ,108 and they preserved the confidenti-
ality of their records even when they adjourned. Mer a delegate
argued that "if suffered to be made public, a bad use [might] be
made of [the records] by those who would wish to prevent the
adoption of the Constitution,"109 the delegates adopted with vir-
tual unanimity a motion to deposit the records with George
Washington, the Convention's presiding officer, to be turned
over to Congress ifand when the Constitution was ratified. Mer
all the "loose scraps" were burned (in what may have been the
first paper-shredding episode in our nation's history), the trans-
fer took place and the records remained in confidential limbo
until 1818, when they were collated by John Quincy Adams and
published.no A persistent problem for originalists is the behavior
of the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention: if they thought
that their intent ought to be controlling in interpreting the Con-
105. 5.ANNALs OF CoNG. 776 (1796). Madison's emphasis on the ratifiers, and the irrel-
evance of his Notes, may reflect the Philadelphia delegates' violation of their mandates. See
THE FEDERAUsr No. 40 (James Madison). Thomas M. Cooley went further by suggesting
that plain meaning should prevail over intent, because all that was enacted was the lan-
guage; and the intent that matters is not that of the ratifiers or members of the constitu-
· tional convention, but that of "WE THE PEOPLE." SeeTHOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE CoNsrITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REsr UPON THE UGISLATIVE POWER OF THE
, STATES OF THE AMEJuCAN UNION 66-67 (1868).
106. U.S. CoNsr. pmbl.
107. See MICHAEL A. GIllESPIE & MICHAEL LIENESCH, RATIFYING THE CoNsrITUTION ix
· (1989).
· 'l08. See CuNrON RoSSITER, 1789: THE GRAND CoNVENIlON 168 (MacGibbon & Kee
1968).
, 109. 2 REcoRDS OF FEDERAL CoNVENIlON OF 1787, at 648 (M. Farrand ed., 1911).
110. 1 id. at xi-xiii; see alsoJames Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of
the Documentary Retard, 65 TEX. L. REv, I, 6-9 (recording the history of the records).
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stitution, how could they have justified keeping the delegates to
the state conventions in the dark during the ratification debates?
Originalists are also embarrassed, or should be, by the strange
history of a second source that often is used to reconstruct the
intent of the Framers: Madison's Notes, his daily record of the
Philadelphia debates. This is the fullest and evidently the most
accurate of several unofficial reports, even though according to a
recent estimate it covered no more than ten percent of the pro-
ceedings.Ill But Madison treated his notes as private property,
refusing to publish them during his lifetime because, as he put it,
the Philadelphia proceedings "could never be regarded as the
oracular guide in expounding the Constitution."1l2 After
Madison's death, Congress purchased the Notes from his widow,
and they were at last made public in 1840, more than half a cen-
tury after the Constitution was ratified. Originalists have never
explained why the intent of the Framers should be reconstructed
from a privately-owned document that was withheld from the del-
egates to the state ratifying conventions-the very persons who,
according to Madison himself, converted the Philadelphia Con-
vention's "draft of a plan" into a legally effective Constitution.
But anyone who, following Madison's lead, seeks to extract the
intent of the Framers from the proceedings of the thirteen state
ratifying conventions faces fonnidable obstacles.lIS The conven-
tions, which met separately during the period 1787-90, were
open to the public, but there were no official reporters, and the
unofficial versions of the debates hawked by entrepreneurs are
partisan, inaccurate, garbled, and fragmentary.1l4 Writing in
1833, Justice Joseph Story rejected the possibility of distilling a
homogenized intent of the Framers from what little is known of
the ratification debates:
111. See Hutson, supra note 110, at 34; if. LEvY, supra note 62, at 287·88 (calculating
that at best Madison could have recorded only twenty percent of the debates).
112. 5 ANNALs OF CoNG. 776 (1796).
113. See LEvY, supra note 62, at 289-91.
114. See id. at 268 (describing the unsatisfactory state of the records of the debates): see
also Hutson, supra note 110, at 34 (stating that Madison's Notes for any particular day take
only a few minutes to read aloud). Even the most trustworthy record of the state debates,
that ofVrrginia's convention, was described by Madison as containing an "abundance of
chasms, and misconceptions of what was said." H.]efferson Powell, The Politital Grammar
ofEariy Constitutional Law, 7I N.C. L REv. 949, 963 n.79 (1993); see also NATIONAL H~ORI.
CAL PuBUCATIONS CoMM'N, A NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR PUBUCATION OF HISfORlCAL QqC!J.
MENTS 84 (1954) (describing ELLIOT'S DEBATES as "crudely" edited and asserting that the
"texts are unreliable").
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Opposite interpretations, and different explanations of differ-
ent provisions, may well be presumed to have been presented
in different bodies, to remove local objections, or to win local
favor. And there can be no certainty, either that the different
state conventions in ratifying the constitution, gave the same
uniform interpretation to its language, or that, even in a single
state convention, the same reasoning prevailed with a m:yor-
ity, much less with the whole of the supporters of it,us
If it were true that the ratifiers wanted their intent to control the
courts in deciding constitutional issues, they can be justly ac-
cused of gross negligence for failing to take even rudimentary
steps to preserve their precious thoughts.
Finally, originalists frequently rely on the Federalist Papers for
evidence of the intent of the Framers. But this "debater's hand-
book,"116 written by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and
JohnJay to ann the pro-ratification delegates of several wavering
States (primarily NewYork and Virginia), is even less official and
more partisan than the records of the Philadelphia Convention,
Madison's Notes, and the records of the state ratifying conven-
tions. An eminent constitutional historian ranked the Federalist
Papers as "third only to the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution itself among all the sacred writings of American
political history," but he nevertheless concluded that it had little
influence on the outcome of the struggle for ratification.117 The
most recent scholarly analysis asserts that its impact \vas "negligi-
ble" even in NewYork.118 Moreover, one of the few things known
with certainty about the impact of the Federalist Papers is that
more than half of the essays were published after five of the state
conventions had completed their work and adjourned, and
hence could have had no influence on their delegates.119
Turning from the original Constitution to the Bill of Rights,
one finds that the surviving documents are, if anything, even less
adequate as a record of the intent of the Framers-the members
of the first Congress, which drafted the amendments, and of the
state legislatures, which ratified them. The principal version of
, 115. 1 STORY, supra note 64, § 406.
116. Clinton Rossiter, Introduction to THE FEDERAUST PAPERS xi (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
'1961).
, 117. Id. at vii, xi.
I 118. John P. Kaminski, New York: The Reluctant PiUar, in THE RELUCTANT PILLAR: NEW
YORK AND TIlE ADOPTION OF TIlE CoNSTITU1l0N 71-72 (Stephen L. Schechter ed., 1985).
. 119. See Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the]urispnuience ofOriginal Intent: The Reamt
Past, 77 CAL. L. REv. 235, 270-73 (1989).
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the House debates was written by an author described by
Madison as "a votary of the bottle" whose reports "abound in er-
rors; some of them very gross,"120 and no one, drunk or sober,
recorded the debates in either the Senate or the state
legislatures.
The debates leading up to later amendments are better docu-
mented, but the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-whose Due Process121 and Equal Protection Clauses are
the most peIVasively influential of all the additions to the Consti-
tution since its ratification-"must be divined from materials al-
most as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to
interpret for Pharaoh," as Justice Jackson said in an analogous
context122 and as was demonstrated by the time-eonsuming ef-
forts of the NAACP lawyers to answer the questions posed by the
Supreme Court when it set the Brown case down for reargu-
ment.123 Although the Equal Protection Clause was drafted and
ratified more than a century ago, there is still no scholarly con-
sensus on whether its Framers intended to prohibit the States
from enacting laws that treat citizens differently if they vary in
such attributes as gender, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, na-
tive language, age, family status, or place of birth.124 Another
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbidding states to
abridge "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States,"125 is either a trivial or a crucial element of constitutional
law, depending on how one interprets the meager evidence of
the Framers' intent.
120. LEw, supra note 62, at 293.
121. See U.S. CoN5r. amend, XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ••• deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
122. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
123. See supra Pan I.B.
124. As Henry Louis Gates recently observed in the NEW YORKER, prejudices are not
easily compared; they "all come with distinctive and distinguishing historical peculiari-
ties." Henry Louis Gates, Blacklash, NEWYoRKER, May 17,1993. For a rigorous originalis~.
the constitutional promise of"equal protection of the laws" was made to blacks emerging
from slavery and it must be stretched beyond its proper limits to encompass legal discrimi-
nation based on religion, ethnic origin, descent, national origin, gender, or, for that mat-
ter, even to free northern blacks. See, e.g., The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)
(describing the main pwpose of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and FIfteenth Amendments
as the elimination of slavery, the grant of U.S. citizenship to former slaves, and the pre-
vention of oppression by former slave owners).
125. U.S. CoN5r. amend. XIV, § 1.
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C. The Problem of the Passage of Time
Even if the records from which the intent of the Framers is to
be extracted were more complete and reliable than the fragmen-
tary and garbled scraps that have survived, we cannot escape the
inconvenient fact that the Framers' views and our constitutional
issues emerge from very different worlds. Originalists do not
deny this, but they sometimes suggest that a diligent search of
the archives will discover the answers that the Framers, if resur-
rected and asked what they intended, would give to today's con-
stitutional questions.
Is this mission impossible? Not necessarily. The Justices in the
Brown case, for example, might have tried to imagine how the
Framers, while living in the America of 1868, would have re-
sponded if they had encountered a few black parents who de-
manded that their children be admitted to white schools then
and there. Another way to recover-or would it create?-the
Framers' intent would be to exhume and resurrect them, send
them on an imaginary tour of the America of today, and then
ask: "If in 1866-1869 you had foreseen ourworld, how would you
have intended the Equal Protection Clause to be applied to the
facts in the Brown case?" (Presumably we would refuse to accept
responses like: "Had we envisioned this heaven-on-earth (or this
earthly hell), we would have proposed a wholly different form of
government.") Of course, the words attributed to the Framers in
either of these fanciful discourses would come from our lips, not
theirs. When we embark on an excursion into history, we take
our intellectual baggage with us; if some of it is labeled "not
needed on the voyage," we necessarily use our criteria, not the
Framers', in deciding what to set aside. Nonetheless, we routinely
invoke the "lessons of history"-for example, what we learned or
should have learned from appeasing Hitler, or from the Viet
Nam war-and references to the intent of the Framers are not
much different.
. Raoul Berger, originalism's most prolific exemplar, seems to
contemplate an exercise of this type, butJudge Bork asserts flatly
that "we cannot know how the Framers would vote on specific
cases today, in a very different world from the one they knew."126
Bork, however, dismisses this difficulty as "entirely beside the
126. Roben H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 823, 826 (1986).
HeinOnline -- 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 36 1995-1996
36 HaroardJoumal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 19
point," because his model originalist "attempts to discern the
principles the Framers enacted, the values they sought to pro-
tect."127 At first blush, this version of originalism seems to sim-
plify the quest for the intent of the Framers, but in application, it
substitutes one fuzzy target for another-the "principle" or "core
value" (an alternative label often used by Bork) 128 intended by
the Framers instead of the "result" they intended. For example,
the principle that the Supreme Court in Plessy perceived in the
Equal Protection Clause was that the States must treat blacks and
whites the same but can avoid racial "commingling" by providing
separate facilities on an equal basis (blacks being confined to
black schools, but, tit-for-tat, whites being confined to white
schools). The principle described by the NAACP's brief in the
Brown case was that no state action can be predicated upon race
or color. The principle announced by the Supreme Court in
Brown was that blacks may not be deprived of the equal opportu-
nity to enjoy the benefits of public programs. Still others find far
broader principles in the Equal Protection Clause: that the States
cannot use nonvoluntary characteristics like race and gender in
granting benefits and imposing liabilities on their citizens, or
that all citizens-black or white, rich or poor, young or old, male
or female, married or single, sick or well, criminal or law-abid-
ing-must be treated alike unless the distinction is "reasonable"
or serves a compelling public interest
D. The Problem ofPrecedent
1. Threatened Decisions
Difficulties in reconstructing the intent of the Framers do not,
of course, deter historians and political theorists from making
the attempt; indeed, we can pick and choose from a menu that
offers something for every taste. Even so, originalists are sure that
countless Supreme Court decisions were decided in lawless viola-
tion of the intent of the Framers. An index of these condemned
127. Roben H. Bork, Original Intent and the Constitution, 7 HUMAN. 22, 26 (1986). A
perceptive critic, who is on the whole sympathetic to originalism, writes that all cases can
be justified at a high enough level of generality. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
ConstitutianallAw, 88 CoLUM L REv. 723, 739-740 (1988); see also Frank Easterbrook,
Abstraction and Autlwrity, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 349, 368 (1992) (arguing that there is no
"right" level of generality). .
128. See Bork, supra note 126, at 826. However it is applied, Bork's gambit sacrifices
much of the precision claimed by the originalists, and hence restores much of thejudicial
freedom that originalism is supposed to eradicate.
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decisions would include not only Brown v. Board.ofEducation,129
but also Roe v. Wade,130 Griswold v. Connecticur31 (holding uncon-
stitutional Connecticut's prohibition on the use of birth control
devices), Loving v. Virginia132 (holding Virginia's antimiscegena-
tion law unconstitutional), Baker v. Carf33 (requiring Congress
to be reapportioned on a one-person, one-vote principle), and
Enmund v. Florida,I34 holding that in certain circumstances the
death penalty constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment."
In addition to condemning important cases like these, the sys-
tematic application of originalism to constitutional law would de-
molish the fundamental principles on which hundreds of other
decisions rest. A notable target is the so-called "incorporation
doctrine," used by the Supreme Court for more than half a cen-
tury to impose on the States most of the constitutional guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights-for example, freedom of speech and
religion,135 protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures,136 andjust compensation when private property is taken
for a public use.u~7 In 1833, the Bill of Rights was held by Chief
Justice Marshall to apply only to the federal government-so
clearly, in his view, that oral argument to the contrary was
stopped by the COurt.138 However, the Bill ofRights was national-
ized by a series of much more recent hotly contested decisions
proclaiming that the Fourteenth Amendment, especially its Due
129. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).Judge Bork objects to the opinion in the Braum case, not to
the result, which he argues should have been reached on a different ground.Judge Bork
argues that the Framers of the Founeenth Amendment wanted both equality and segrega-
tion, but would have preferred equality to segregation had they realized that these two
concepts were incompatible. Judge Bork acknowledges that this rationale would have left
unscathed the segregated schools in the District of Columbia, which was not SUbjected by
the Framers to the Equal Protection Clause. See BoRK, supra note 63, at 82-83. He might
have added that the same bizarre result would be applicable to the Topeka schools in the
Braum case because the district coun found that the conditions at black and white schools
were "equal," and its conclusion was not challenged by the NAACP.
130. 410 U.S. 113 (1974) (ruling prohibitions on abortion unconstitutional).
131. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
132. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
133. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
134. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
135. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion]; or abridging the freedom of speeCh").
136. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated") •
137. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation").
138. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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Process Clause139 somehow "incorporates" or "absorbs" the re-
strictions that the Bill of Rights imposed on the federal govern-
ment. Particularly important instances are the cases holding that
the practices of holding prayers in the public schools and placing
Nativity scenes on village greens violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment,140 even though its language-"Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion"-clearly refers to the actions of a branch of the federal
government, not to the decisions of state and local officials.
Originalists also inveigh against the judicial recognition (or "in_
vention") of constitutional rights that are not explicitly listed in
the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution, even though
some of these so-called "unenumerated rights," such as the right
to privacy and the right to travel from State to State, have been
long protected by judicial decisions,141 and others are taken for
granted, like the right to marry or to remain single, to conceive
or refrain from conceiving children, to receive a passport to facil-
itate foreign travel, and to speak a foreign language in public
places.142
In 1988 Henry P. Monaghan, a reflective scholar who is sympa-
thetic to originalism, acknowledged that "insistence upon origi-
nal intent as the only legitimate standard for judicial
decisionmaking entails a massive repudiation of the present con-
stitutional order."143 There is no hyperbole in this assessment;
the logic of originalism demands unconditional surrender by the
enemy in whatJudge Bork calls the "war for control of our legal
culture."144
139. U.S. CaNsr. amend, XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law").
140. SeeAllegheny Countyv. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a Nativity scene
placed on courthouse steps violates the Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale. 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (holding that prayer in schools violates the Establishment Clause); see also
Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment made the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment applicable to the States).
141. Thomas K. Landry, Unenumerated Federal Rights: Avenues for Application Against the
States, 44 FLA. L REv. 219 (1992).
142. For a more complete list, see Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and
Constitutional Legitimacy, 64 Qu.-KENT L. REv. 37, 58 (1988); see also David B. Anders,jus-
tias Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between justice O'Connor and justice
Scalia Over Unenumerated Rights, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 895, 897-903 (1993) (discussing the
difference between originalism and fundamental rights as exemplified in the opinions of
Justices O'Connor and Scalia). '
143. Monaghan, supra note 127, at 727.
144. BaRK, supra note 63, at 2.
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2. Stare Decisis as an Empty Vessel
In the last hours of the Gulf War, our military commanders
recoiled from the "turkey shoot" that became possible as Iraq's
forces abandoned Kuwait and fled homeward across the desert.'
Originalism's marksmen also become less ruthless when they
contemplate the legal carnage that would result from pressing
their theory to the extreme. Judge Bork, for example, tells us
that it is now "too late" for the Supreme Court to declare paper
money unconstitutional, despite the Supreme Court's violation
of the intent of the Framers in 1871, when it held in the Legal
Tender Cases that Congress could compel creditors to accept
Treasury notes in payment of their claims, even if the debtors
had promised to pay in gold or silver. l45 Realism can be a great
pacifier, even in a war for control of our legal culture.
Judges wanting to emulate Bork's uncharacteristic tolerance of
entrenched error, however, must confront a troublesome line of
Supreme Court decisions. In many areas of the law, if the repudi-
ation of an earlier decision would unduly disturb settled expecta-
tions, the Supreme Court applies the principle of stare decisis-
"let the decision stand"-and refrains from overruling the ear-
lier decision, even on concluding that it was wrong. The Court
usually refuses to apply this doctrine of repose to constitutional
cases, however, following instead the principle that constitutional
issues are never settled until they are correctly decided.l46 The
conventional rationale for this distinction is, injustice Brandeis's
words, that in non-constitutional cases, "it is [often] more impor-
tant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be set-
tled right,"147 especially because erroneous decisions ordinarily
can be nullified for the future by legislative action. But in consti-
tutional cases, the Court's decision often ties the hands of Con-
gress; and if the Court does not reverse itself in this situation, its
error can be corrected only by the cumbersome process of
amending the Constitution.148
145. Id. at 158; see Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts being applicable to contracts both retroactively
and proactively).
146. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (refusing to overturn
constitutional protection of abortion on the grounds of stare decisis).
147. Burnet v. Colorado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1931) (Brandeis, j.,
dissenting) •
148. The inapplicability of stare decisis to constitutional issues has recently been reas-
serted in justice Scalia's dissent to South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), in
which he quotes justice Douglas's statement that "it is the Constitution which [a Supreme
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As a result, o'riginalists who are uneasy about originalism's
"massive repudiation of the present constitutional order"149 find
themselves in a quandary. If they accept the existing corpus of
constitutional law, asking only that originalism be applied pro-
spectively-by telling the judges, "Go and sin no more"-they
betray the faith they preach with such fervor; but if they import
stare decisis into the constitutional area, they necessarily em-
power today's judges to perpetuate or reject earlier decisions in
their virtually untrammeled discretion, thus fostering the very
government-byjudges that originalism promises to prevent.
Judge Bork, for example, would apply stare decisis to decisions
"validating certain New Deal and Great Society programs"150 even
though he condemns them as unlawful interpretations of the
Constitution, because overturning them would "plunge us into
chaos."151 He does not specify, however, which programs should
be preserved and which can be tenninated without disastrous
consequences. Moreover, Bork's tolerance diminishes when he
turns away from the economic area. For example, he declares
that "it will probably never be too late to overrule the right of
privacy cases, including Roe v. Wade, because they remain unac-
cepted and unacceptable to large segments of the body politic;
andjudicial regulation could at once be replaced by restored leg-
islative regulation of the subject."152Judge Bork's eclecticism also
opens the door to an awesome range ofjudicial discretion when
he argues that even if an erroneous decision "is so thoroughly
embedded in our national life that it should not be overruled," it
should not be allowed to metastasize into new areas, creating still,
more errors.153 Alas, whether a constitutional principle is firmly
embedded or hangs loose depends on the eye of the observer., ,
Confronting these vaporous distinctions-reflecting little
more than Judge Bork's personal preferences?-Professor
Court Justice] swore to support and defend, not the gloss which his predecessors may.
have put on it." Id. at 825; seeWl1liam O. Douglas, StareDedsis, 49 CoLUM. L. REv. 735, 736
(1949). •
149. Monaghan, supra note 127.
150. BoRK, supra note 63, at 158 (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. Id. "Legislative regulation" is, ofcourse, precisely what other"large segments of the'
body politic" abhor. , , ,
153. Id. Similarly, Raoul Berger argued that although judicial decisions can be over-
ruled, events that follow from judicial decisions, in many cases, cannot be changed. ·For
example, assuming arguendo that Brown v. Board oJEducation should and could be over-
ruled, "blacks cannot be forced back into the ghetto." RAOUL BERGER, DEATII PENALTIEs
83 n.29 (1982). .
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Monaghan laments the law's failure to develop "a coherent ra-
tionale for the intermittent invocation of stare decisis," a defi-
ciency that causes the principle to strike "with the rando,:rpness of
a lightning bolt."154 Monaghan goes on to observe that "the cen-
tral problem for originalism is whether the cost of embracing
stare decisis is too high-whether, in the end, the embrace de-
stroys originalism's bedrock assumption that, until formally
amended, the Constitution establishes a permanent ordering
binding on all organs of the government, including the
courts."155 In a wistful, even elegiac tone, he says that the task of
constitutional scholars is "to make sense out of a nonoriginalist




Advocates of a "living Constitution," who collectively are
viewed by originalists as the Great Satan of constitutionalism, use
contemporary values and aspirations as the raw material of their
interpretive method. Because these liberated spirits proclaim
that judges are not confined either by the words of the Constitu-
tion or by the intent of its Framers, their approach is often called
IInoninterpretivism"-a term that is confusingly reminiscent of
the once-popular "plain meaning" theory that the Constitution
can be understood by ordinary citizens without the intervention
of professional interpreters. Rejecting this comforting but out-
moded notion, today's "noninterpretivists"-a portmanteau term
that describes many theorists who are uncomfortable with the la-
bel, and some who reject it-argue that such crucial provisions as
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are too vague ("in-
determinate" is the favored adjective) to have a meaning that can
b~ tliscovered, deduced or teased out by the reader. Instead, the
jud.ges must create meanings for these open-ended phrases. In
support of this assertion, noninterpretivists sometimes draw on
the deconstructionist theories of contemporary literary critics,
hlithely oblivious to the fact that this is not the best way to win
l~~ friends or to influence the profession.
.154..Monaghan, supra note 127, at 743.
155. Id. at 767.
156. Id. at 771.
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If they were not so eager to be hailed as today's avant garde,
however, the noninterpretivists could invoke the authority of
many paragons of the legal establishment who made their mark
when Derrida was still in grade school. Felix Frankfurter, for ex-
ample, wrote in 1938 that open-ended provisions of the Constitu-
tion like the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses are so
ambiguous that the Supreme Court "is compelled to put mean-
ing into the Constitution, not take it out."157 Indeed, two decades
earlier, Woodrow WIlson wrote that "the Constitution of the
United States is not a mere lawyers' document it is a vehicle of
life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age,"158 describing the
Supreme Court as "a kind of Constitutional Convention in con-
tinuous session."159 The same corrosive realism, which would be
denounced as cynicism if it came from an outsider, can be found
in a trio of the most-quoted aphorisms in the law, each by a jurist
who in his day was the toast of countless testimonial dinners:
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience."
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.160
''We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the
judges say it is."
-Charles Evans Hughes161
"The words [of the Constitution] are empty vessels into which
[a judge] can pour nearly anything he will."
-Learned Hand162
To lighten these sober judgments, one might add ChiefJustice
Taft's definition of a constitutional lawyer as someone who
"abandoned the practice of the law and [went] into politicS."163
B. Noninterpretivism Today
As seen by an influential exponent of noninterpretivism, Stan-
ford's Professor Thomas Grey, the judiciary "is the expounder of
157. Felix Frnnkfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitutitm, in MR.JUSTICE HOLMES 50
(Felix Frnnkfurter ed., 1931).
158. WOODROW Wn.soN, CoNSTITUTIONAL GoVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69
(1908).
159. EDWARD S. CoRWIN, THE CoNSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 5 (14th ed.
1978).
160. OUVER WENDElL HOLMES,JR., THE CoMMON LAw 1 (1881).
161. Charles Evans Hughes, Speech Before theElmira Chamber ofCommerce, May J, 1907, in
ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 139 (1908). , .
162. Learned Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L REv. I, 12 (1930).
163. 2 MERLo J. PuSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 625 (1951).
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basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment, even
when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter of
positive law in the written Constitution."164 Thus, instead of pur-
porting to "interpret" the Constitution, noninterpretivism uses it
as a springboard:
[T]he broad textual provisions are seen as sources of legiti~
macy for judicial development and explication of basic shared
national values. These values may be seen as permanent and
universal features of human social arrangements-natural law
principles-as they typically were in the 18th and 19th centu-
ries. Or they may be seen as relative to our particular civiliza-
tion, and subject to growth and change, as they typically are
today.165
Enlarging (or, perhaps, only embroidering) this summary of
noninterpretivism, other scholars have said that it is "a search for
political~mora1knowledge, for answers to the various questions as
to how we, the polity, should live our public, collective life, our
life in common;"166 "a model of open-ended modernism," which
"pennits the Court to give meaning to all constitutional provi-
sions on the basis of contemporary values that theJustices regard
as worthy of constitutional protection [recognizing] that their
decisions are inevitably based on their personal values;"167 a pro-
cess of adjudication that "should enforce those, but only those,
values which are fundamental to our society;"168 a judicial search
"for values deeply embedded in the society, values treasured by
both past and present, values behind which the society and its
1~ga1 system have unmistakably throvm their weights;"169 "an ex-
pression of the possibilities of democracy," built on "the classical
conception of a republic, including its elements of relative equal-
ity, mobilization of the citizenry, and civic virtue;"17o and a pro-
cess of reaching "into the Constitution's spirit and structure" to
"promote the fullest development of human faculties and ensure
- iti4. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unumtten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 706
(1975).
165. Id. at 709.
166. Michael J. Perry, The Autlwrity of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Themy of Constitu-
tional "Interpretation, n 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 573 (1985).
167. Erwin Cherminsky, Interpreting the Constitution 109 (1987). Cherminsky, how-
ever,' does not explicitly use the label "noninterpretivist."
168. Paul Brest, The Misconceived QJust for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv.
204, 227 (1980).
• 169. Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Standards ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv.
981, 1040 (1979).
170. Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Themy-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST.
LJ. 223, 258-259 (1981).
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the greatest breadth to personal liberty and community," without
being deterred by the "obviously incomplete listing [of rights] in
the Bill of Rights."171
In giving content to these values and aspirations, the judges
are advised by a prominent noninterpretivist to hearken to "the
prophetic voices that emerge, from time to time, in the commu-
nity (Martin Luther King, Jr.'s voice, for example, or Abraham
Joshua Heschel's or Dorothy Day's)."172 A spiritual guide of a
more ecumenical persuasion might add Jerry Falwell, Elijah Mo-
hammad, and Cardinal O'Connor. This would no doubt infuri-
ate some campus audiences, but when were prophets welcomed
by happy faces? At a minimum, the raw material for a noninter-
pretivist Constitution seems to encompass the entire reading list
of a college survey course in Western Civilization; and if
noninterpretivists are closet devotees ofmulticulturalism, despite
their incessant appeals to "our" values, perhaps thejudges should
also peruse the bibliography ofWorld Thought and Culture 101.
C. Whither Noninterpretivism?
Descriptions of noninterpretivism vary and the authors un-
doubtedly believe that they each have added a unique ingredient
to the potpourri. Reading them in rapid succession, however, is
like listening to a dozen Fourth ofJuly orations; the speakers dif-
fer in eloquence and decibel level, but a homogenized message
comes through: Ever Onward, Ever Upward. This impression that
noninterpretivism has no limits is enhanced by its own internal
logic. If the judges cannot expect to find any fixed meaning in
the words of the Constitution but must instead pour meaning
into them, they should presumably follow the same interpretive
strategy and insert their own "meanings" into the "aspirations,"
"ideals," "basic shared values," and "prophetic voices" that are en-
dorsed by the theorists of noninterpretivism.
It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that originalists like
Judge Bork, on reading the writings of contemporary noninter-
pretivists, fear that a horde of refonnist judges, zealous to
reinvent society, will be inspired to go on the prowl for targets of
opportunity. This anxiety, however, is not unique to originalists.
Noninterpretivists are also wary of a hyperactive judiciary, and
171. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrmmONAL LAw 1308 (2d ed. 1987).
172. MICHAEL]. PERRY, MoRALl1Y, POLInes, AND LAw 146 (1988).
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agree that, as one commentator has observed, judicial review of
legislation "ought to be limited or constrained in some way to
assure that the Justices will not end up doing what they think is
good orjust and calling it constitutional law."173 Some disturbers
of the peace might wish to revise this caveat to read: "Thejudges
ought to be constrained to assure that they do not end up doing
what we think is not good orjust and calling it constitutional law."
But how, we may ask, can a noninterpretivistjudge distinguish
between plausible incremental changes and what have been
called utopian dangers?174 If, for example, our "deeply imbed-
ded values" entitle resident aliens to a full-scale hearing on
claims for political asylum, should the courts lay the cornerstone
for a still more benign society by ordering the State Department
to issue visas and free airline tickets to politically oppressed peo-
ple throughout the world so they can come here to present their
claims for asylum in person? If the political-moral responsibilities
of a democratic superpower permit the President as Com-
mander-in-Chief of our armed forces to assign troops to serve
abroad under the command of the United Nations, should the
courts also support the President if he authorizes the Secretary
General of the United Nations to extend their terms of service
beyond the date fixed when they enlisted and to shoot any Amer-
ican soldier who refuses to obey orders? In the same vein, should
ourjudges cut through legislative bickering and executive vacilla-
tion by ordering the government to provide universal medical
care, reduce the federal deficit, raise the minimum wage, send
humanitarian aid to the hundred neediest foreign countries,
withdraw our troops from Korea, call up the National Guard to
police the streets of the nation's capital, and improve the
teacher-student ratio in our public schools?
To justify issuing orders like these, the judges could point to
the noninterpretivist canon of national traditions, values, aspira-
tions, ideals, and prophetic voices. For instance, the pediment of
the building housing United States Supreme Court promises
"Equal Justice for All;" one of the goals of the Constitution is to
"insure domestic Tranquility;"175 we pledge allegiance to a coun-
try "with liberty andJustice for all;" Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1944
173. Larry Simon, The Authority ofthe Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L REv. 603, 605 (1985).
174. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271, 2276
(1990).
175. U.S. CaNST. pmbl.
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message to Congress promulgated an Economic Bill of Rights,
declaring that everyone has the right "to a useful and remunera-
tive job ... adequate medical care ... adequate protection from
the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident and unemploy-
ment [and] a good education;"176 the Statue of Liberty invites
the world to send us "Your huddled masses yearning to breathe
free;" and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims
that "[n]0 one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with
his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks on
his honour and reputation" and that everyone has "the right ...
to a social and international order in which [these rights] can be
fully realized."177
The conventional response to conundrums of this type, which
are the daily bread of legal education, is that we are blessed with
an "interpretive community" (a beguiling self-description of the
professoriat, the voluntary watchdogs of the legal world) that rec-
ognizes limits on judicial discretion that are powerful, objective,
and commonly shared, even though they cannot be reduced to a
fonnula. By praising or hectoring the judges, it is asserted, acade-
micians can enforce these standards, thereby impelling the
courts to give us a "living" Constitution without unduly supersed-
ing the social, political, and economic choices made by Congress.
In this vein, a member of the imaginary academic supercourt
writes, "It will be up to us not only to evaluate the [Supreme]
Court's moral vision, but to guide it as well." In an appealing
burst of realism, he then concedes, "Clearly, that will be a heavy
burden."178
D. Ascertaining "Shared Values"
Fifty years ago, constitutional law was the domain of an l'inter-
pretive community"-a little band of brothers (they had no aca-
demic sisters), teaching at a few national law schools ('lnational"
being a euphemism for "elite," contrasting with "regional," a eu-
phemism for "provincial"), who professed to know instinctively
176. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Omgress,january 11, 1944, in NOTHING TO
FEAR: THE SELECTED ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN DElANO ROOSEVELT 1932-1945, at 396 (B.D.
Zevin ed., 1946).
177. U.N. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 12, 14 (1948), reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Ian Brownlie ed., 1992).
178. Richard B. Saphire, Making Noninterpretivism Respectable: Michael] Peny's Conlrihu-
tilms to Constitutional Theory, 81 MICH. L. REv. 782, 800 (1983) (reviewing MICHAEL J.
PERRY, THE CoN5ITI1JTION, THE CoURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTs: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGIT.
IMACY OF CoN5ITI1JTIONAL POUCYMAKING BY THE JVOICIARY (1982».
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what was de rigeur, and what was infra dig. In those golden days,
Felix Frankfurter, without tongue in cheek, could assert, "In the
last analysis ... the law and the lawyers are what the law schools
make them."179 Even when they were riding high~ however, the
professors of constitutional law rarely spied out the land and sig-
naled the Supreme Court to move forward; instead they savored
its opinions at leisure, and delivered their evaluations in formal
lectures and graceful essays. Moreover, since the heyday of the
mandarins, the number of teachers of constitutional law has
grown from about one hundred (in 1930) to nearly fifteen thou-
sand. This increase by itself has produced fissures in profusion-
nodding assent to one's elders is not the best route to tenure
these days-but the professoriat is split still further by clusters of
talented and dedicated dissenters, such as political radicals, femi-
nists, gays and lesbians, Native Americans, blacks, narrative-tell-
ers, and other groups seeking, in the language of the day, to
change the legal structure in order to "empower" people who
have been systematically "marginalized" by the law. These aca-
demic advocates for society's underdogs and outsiders concur in
charging that the legal establishment's claim to be objective and
dispassionate is camouflage-self-deluding at best, deliberate at
worst-to protect the political and economic status quo. This,
however, does not mean that they are entirely comfortable with
noninterpretivism. To the contrary. They welcome its insistence
thatjudges can, or must, seek guidance from sources outside the
four comers of the Constitution; but no dissenting group can
accept the notion that all extra-eonstitutional sources are equally
legitimate or that the "values deeply embedded in the society"
necessarily are benign. These advocates claim, instead, that some
values seIVe to justify oppression and must be pulled up by the
roots.
The result is that today's academic "interpretive community)' is
too fragmented to agree upon the sources that ought to govern
judges wishing to practice noninterpretivism; the preferences of
the would-be tutors are as diverse as the material itself. Moreover,
"our" shared values, "our" traditions, "our" life in common, and
~~ other noninterpretivist sources of constitutional meaning
·179. Hany T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992) (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School, to Mr. Rosenwald (May 13, 1927) (Felix Frankfurter papers,
HaIVard Law School Library».
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emanate from the citizenry as a whole, not merely from the legal
academy or the judiciary. Lawyers and judges feed the stream, of
course, but their contribution is quickly absorbed and diluted.
This suggests that the watchword of noninterpretivism should be
"Follow the Public" and that its goal should be an accurate depic-
tion for thejudges of the values and ideals that the public accepts
and by which it lives.
As it happens, noninteipretivism swept the legal academy at
the same time that popular culture witnessed the relentless con-
version of legal events into commercial "products" in a process
that has pushed the boundaries of "the interpretive community"
outward to include anyone who owns a TV set. During the Senate
Judiciary Committee's televised hearings on the nominations of
Judges Bork, Souter, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer to
be Justices of the Supreme Court, citizens everywhere heard talk
in abundance about the intent of the Framers, strict construc-
tion, judicial activism, natural law, and the other girders of con-
stitutional law's infrastructure; and they quickly took to their
new-found roles as participant-observers. Millions of Americans
have learned from The Paper Chase and TV reconstructions of law
school classrooms that legal propositions almost always have soft
cores and that a precedent usually turns into a bed of Procrustes
if it must accommodate a later case with somewhat different
facts.
In short, the public has learned that the life of the law is amb~­
guity, and that they can debate the disputed issues in much the
same way that these issues are debated by the experts. Schooled
in legal jargon, TV watchers can respond as fast as the actors to
phrases like "move to suppress," and they know that if a hand-
cuffed suspect is not "given his rights" in the first scene of a
crime show, the drama's turning point will be a clash of legal
claims about exceptions to the Miranda rule. Aficionados of the
legal culture who need a fix after hours can now turn to Court
TV, a twenty-four hour forensic convenience store offering trials,
appellate arguments, commentary and lectures, which adver~~~s
that its audiences can watch "the real life drama ofjustice" and
"decide for themselves some of the most important questions fac-
ing the nation today." Once President Clinton's Infonnation Su-
perhighway is completed, perhaps even earlier, this volunteer
interpretive community will no doubt be served by interactive de-
vices, so that panels of couch potatoes, perfonning as sha40wju-
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ries, will be able to announce their verdicts on everyone's
electronic bulletin board before the courtroom jurors complete
their deliberations.
The Information Superhighway seems tailor-made, if that term
can be applied to a high-tech venture, to clarify the
benchmarks-like "our basic shared values" and the "deeply im-
bedded ideals and traditions of our society"-that noninterpre-
tivists recommend to judges as sources of enlightenment in
giving meaning to the Constitution. Instead of sending their law
clerks to the library to discover the values and traditions that "we
the people" share and respect, the judges could listen directly to
the voices of the people at their electronic town meetings; and
the judges will be able to refresh their recollections in tranquil-
lity by calling up the transcript of the public debate from an ever-
ready, random-access data base. But will the judges be willing to
turn from books, augmented by introspection, to the electronic
fast track? For a case study, we can examine the way Justices
Thurgood Marshall and William J. Brennan, Jr., both of whom
opposed the death penalty, responded to assertions that the pub-
lic disagreed with their verdict.
In 1972,Justice Marshall announced that in his opinion capital
punishment "violates the Eighth Amendment [prohibiting the
infliction of "cmel and unusual" punishment] because it is mor-
ally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time
in their history"180_a quintessentially noninterpretivist standard
of constitutionality. Acknowledging that public opinion polls did
not support his reading of the common conscience, Marshall as-
serted that "American citizens know almost nothing about capital
punishment"181 (citing, perhaps because of a law clerk's error,
.three books that make no such claim). But he announced that
they would agree with him that the death penalty is morally unac-
ceptable if they were fully informed,182 provided they also satis-
fied another condition, the suppression of any desire for
vengeance. This condition is required by the Constitution, ac-
cording to Justice Marshall, because "no one has ever seriously
advanced retribution as a legitimate goal of our society."IB3
180. Funnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 360 (1972) (Marshall.]., concurring)•
.. 181. let.
182. See id.
, 183. let. at 363. Perhaps the eye-for-an-eye principle, see Exodus 21:24, went out with
school prayer.
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It is unlikely, however, thatJustice Marshall would have wished
to submit these conjectures-public ignorance and the rejection
of retribution as a goal of the criminaljustice system-to a reality
check in the form of an electronic plebiscite, even if opponents
of the death penalty were given unlimited time to present their
arguments before the public voted. Justice Marshall's assertion
that the death penalty is "morally unacceptable" to his country-
men is best understood not as a statement of fact but as the ex-
pression of a noble dream that cannot be punctured by
unwelcome evidence, much like his argument in the Brown case
that the legislators who drafted and ratified the Equal Protection
Clause in the late 1860s intended to prohibit all state action
predicated upon race or color. In both cases, Justice Marshall
appealed to the better angels of our nature, who cannot be ques-
tioned by pollsters.
Like Justice Marshall, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. believed
that the death penalty is unconstitutional, declaring in 1972 that
"its rejection by contemporary society is virtually total."184 In a
1985 speech announcing that originalism is "little more than ar-
rogance cloaked as humility," he asserted that constitutional in-
terpretation "must be undertaken with full consciousness that it
is, in a very real sense, the community's interpretation that is
sought."185 Taken in context, this reference to the "community"
meant the citizenry as a whole, not the professoriat or the legal
profession; butJustice Brennan quickly rejected any implication
that "the community's interpretation" of the Constitution could
be ascertained by polling the members of the community. In-
deed, Justice Brennan admitted that "a majority of my fellow
countrymen" did not subscribe to his view that the death penalty
is morally repellent; but their dissenting voices, Justice Brennan
declared, merely compelled him, because of "a larger constitu-
tional duty to the community, to ... point toward a different
path" and thereby "to embody a community striving for human
dignity for all."186 Like Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan claims
that he speaks for his fellow citizens when they are on their best
behavior, and that their lapses from this standard are unfortu-
nate but irrelevant aberrations. In this spirit, Justice Brennan
would unquestionably brush aside his countrymen's responses to
184. Id. at 305 (Brennan,]., concurring).
185. Brennan, supra note 3, at 434.
186. Id. at 444.
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a 1991 questionnaire sponsored by the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, which reported that more than half of the
respondents would grant no legal protection to persons who ad-
vocate "Satanism or other religious cults," burn the flag as a polit-
ical protest, or use obscene gestures in public, and that more
than a third would deny legal protection to persons advocating
homosexual behavior, taking the Lord's name in vain, or "using
slang words that refer to sexual acts."187 With public opinion
polls like these staring them in the face, it is not surprising that
even the most avowedly populist of our judges prefer introspec-
tion as a source of inspiration when interpreting the
Constitution.
IV. JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT
But if the courts are unleashed by noninterpretivism to pour
meaning into the Constitution, why don't they set fundamental
reformist goals for themselves, asJudge Bork fears? The answer is
to be found more in their temperament than in the content of
these noninterpretivist sources or the words of the Constitution.
Judges are cautious and reflective, if not by nature, then by nur-
ture: legal education is respectful of precedent and favors incre-
mental changes over convulsions; the profession confers its
greatest rewards on lawyers who adapt to the system; and candi-
dates for appointment to the federal courts must go through a
process of Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation that
subliminally proclaims that mavericks need not apply. Presidents
may yearn for a Supreme Court that mirrors America, its margins
as well as its middle; but even if there is a Presidential will, there
is not necessarily a political way. President Clinton announced
that he 'wanted to "hit a 'home run'" with his first nominee to the
Supreme Court by choosing someone "who would make every-
one stand up and say, 'WOW.'''188 When the names on the presi-
dential short list leaked out, however, there were many nods of
approval, but little if any amazement. This was, or should have
been, no surprise. If a nominee for a judgeship is described as
"outside of the mainstream," the synonyms that come to mind
are not "bold," "daring," and "innovative," but "reckless," "arbi-
187. RoBERT O. 'WYAIT, FREE ExPANSION AND THE AMERiCAN PuBuc 153-65 (1991).
188. Thomas L. Friedman, The Supreme Court: News Analysis-The 11th Hour Scramble:
AfterHapingfor a "Home Run" in C1wosing aJustice, Clinton May BeJust Home Free, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 1993, at AI.
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trary," and "dogmatic;" and if an instinctive flight toward the
middle fails, the nomination is soon, as thejournalists say (and as
Judge Bork quickly learned), in deep trouble.
Federal judges, to be sure, have life tenure, so candidates who
survive the appointment filter are free to break with tradition.
This sometimes happens. Observers familiar with Chief Justice
Warren's background, for example, would not have predicted
that he would push vigorously for the result in Brown v. Board of
Education, and the same could have been said ofJustice Black-
mun and Ene v. Wade. But these are exceptions. By and large, the
Supreme Court's occasional John the Baptist stays in the wilder-
ness because a critical mass of the other Justices cannot be per-
suaded to go along with bold, daring and innovative
constitutional principles. Indeed, in most constitutional cases,
even judges who are partisans of reform seek to convince their
colleagues that the "correct" result can be found in the web of
existing cases, or that it requires only a marginal refinement of a
doctrine that is already widely accepted. Seldom do judges reex-
amine the foundations on which their prior decisions rest, and
hence they seldom are forced to choose between originalism and
noninterpretivism.
Judge Bork predicts that judges who are not faithful to the in-
tent of the Framers will rely on their "moral predilections" in
deciding cases.189 This claim (which in actuality may not shock
the laity as much as Judge Bork thinks it should) is too ambigu-
ous to be either accepted or rejected. If"moral predilections" are
the convictions that the judge would espouse as a private citizen,
politician, or policy wonk, few students ofjudicial behavior would
agree withJudge Bork; but if the term encompasses the attitudes
of the men and women who are nominated and confirmed as
federaljudges in our society, Bork's claim is scarcely more than a
tautology. Judges, of course, behave like judges; and their moral
predilections are not the preferences and prejudices of private
citizens, but instead re.flect the training and experiences of law-
yers as well as the judge's own ever-present knowledge of the dif-
ference between judges and legislators.
An illustration of what might be called the federal judiciary's
moral predilections about its proper role in constitutional cases
can be found in the Supreme Court's deliberations before it de-
189. Bork, supra note 2, at 1063.
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cided Brown v. Board ofEducation. According to all reports, the
Justices agreed that school segregation was a repellent practice;
and this, by Judge Bork's lights, should inexorably have driven
them to attack the dragon with zeal, once they decided that the
intent of the Framers of the Equal Protection Clause was either
irrelevant or inconclusive. But, except perhaps for Justice Wil-
liam O. Douglas, there were no impulsive knights among them.
Instead, facing their greatest opportunity in this century to repu-
diate a social evil, their collective mood was hesitant, anguished,
gloomy, foreboding. When Chief Justice Warren managed to
muster a unanimous vote to condemn school segregation, the
opinion suggested that the decision did little more than apply
the principles announced in the Court's two 1950 decisions
prohibiting segregated facilities in state universities, as though
the Justices wanted to comfort themselves or the public with a
security blanket.
It is possible that in time, law schools will indoctrinate their
students with a passion for the wilder shores of noninterpretiv-
ism; if so, this taste may spread through the profession and gen-
erate a more ambitious and daring breed of would-be judges.
Perhaps the Information Superhighway will speed up the pro-
cess, for example, by staging previews of the President's nomi-
nees to the Supreme Court before the Senate Judiciary
Committee can bestir itself to schedule its formal hearings. With
a few lawyers skilled in cross-examination disguised as Senators
and an impresario who can command prime time, such a TV
show might get a higher Nielsen rating than the real thing. If a
future President announces that he or she plans to nominate a
candidate for the Supreme Court who will evoke a "Wow" from
the American public, the national electronic data base (pro-
tected, of course, against tampering by hired or mischievous
hackers) could be searched for all utterances by everyone on the
Presidential short list, using key phrases like "intent of the Fram-
ers," "right to life," "hate speech" and "humanitarian mission;"
and then the candidates could be given real "Wow" ratings in
real time by real people.
If this imagined electronic rating of aspirants to the federal
judiciary should materialize, however, it may tum out to be only
a harmless video game; but perhaps political life will imitate elec-
tronic art. If so, it might produce more judges with a zest for
social reform; but a more likely outcome is a narrowing of the
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spectrum as controversial candidates are blackballed, leaving
fewer Borks, fewer Hugo Blacks (who briefly belonged to the Ku
Klux Klan as a young lawyer), and fewer Earl Warrens (who, as
Attorney General and then Governor of California during World
War II, vigorously supported theJapanese exclusion orders). The
survivors would then be centrists with resumes attesting explicitly
to their diligence, intelligence, moderation, and prudence, and
implicitly to their skill in avoiding controversy, with perhaps a
sprinkling of candidates who managed to ply their trade without
generating a paper trail, unless they are eliminated after being
portrayed as dunces or Trojan horses.
V. CONCLUSION
All in all, the best bet is that ourjudges will continue to invoke
"the American scheme ofjustice," "ordered liberty," "community
standards," and other noninterpretivist ideals, values and aspira-
tions, but will not take these concepts anywhere near their logical
extremes. Of course, glaciers sometimes melt into raging
streams, but not even the Old Farmer's Almanac ventures to pre-
dict when. At least for the foreseeable future, we can expect
judges to draw copiously on noninterpretivist sources when em-
bellishing their opinions, but to decide cases, well, judiciously.
